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SYMPOSIUM

The Morality of
Killing Human
Embryos
Bonnie Steinbock

E

mbryonic stem cell research is morally and
politically controversial because the process
of deriving the embryonic stem (ES) cells kills
embryos. If embryos are, as some would claim, human
beings like you and me, then ES cell research is clearly
impermissible. If, on the other hand, the blastocysts
from which embryonic stem cells are derived are not
yet human beings, but rather microscopic balls of undifferentiated cells, as others maintain, then ES cell
research is probably morally permissible. Whether the
research can be justiﬁed depends on such issues as its
cost, chance of success, and numbers likely to beneﬁt. But this is an issue for any research project, not
just ES cell research. What makes the debate over ES
cell research controversial is that it, like the debate
over abortion, raises “questions that politicians cannot
settle: when does human life begin, and what is the
moral status of the human embryo?”1 This paper looks
at several theories of moral status and their implications for embryo research.
When we ask whether a being has moral status, we
are asking whether it counts or matters from the moral
point of view; whether it must be considered in our
moral deliberations. It seems obvious that not everything has moral status. We are not required to consider the impact of our moral decisions on mere things
– for example, ordinary rocks. It seems equally obvious
that paradigmatic people – people like you and me
– do have moral status. In fact, most people take it for
granted that even if moral status isn’t limited to people
(that animals count, for example) human beings count
for more. To express this in Kantian terms, humanity
has a dignity and worth which separates humankind
from the rest of creation. Because this view is commonplace in moral thinking and in the law, we can call
it the common-sense view of moral status.

The Common-Sense View: The Biological
Humanity Criterion
The common-sense view of moral status is derived
from the Judeo-Christian tradition which teaches that
only human beings are created in God’s image, and
therefore human beings alone have this special moral
status. In addition, this special moral status belongs
to all human beings, regardless of race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender. We are all God’s children. Compared to views that limit moral status to members of
one’s own group or tribe, the Judeo-Christian view is
quite progressive. Theoretically (though often not in
reality), it prohibits the enslaving or killing of other
Bonnie Steinbock, Ph.D., is Professor of Philosophy at the
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26

journal of law, medicine & ethics

Bonnie Steinbock

The common-sense view of moral status is derived
human beings, simply because they
are “outsiders.” The secular version
from the Judeo-Christian tradition which teaches
of this view bases the unique moral
that only human beings are created in God’s image,
status of humanity on a biological
and therefore human beings alone have this special
category – membership in the species homo sapiens.
moral status. In addition, this special moral status
The biological humanity critebelongs to all human beings, regardless of race,
rion of moral status states that all
ethnicity, nationality, or gender.
and only human beings, members
of our species, have full moral status. But even those who agree on
the criterion may differ on this question: when does a
remains capable, if properly manipulated, of develhuman being come into existence? Sometimes this is
oping into a full human being. One kind of cloning
put in a different way: when does human life begin?
– called embryo splitting or blastomere separation – is
But this question, familiar from the abortion debate,
accomplished in this way. Embryo splitting also occurs
poses the issue in a misleading way, because every cell
naturally in the case of identical twins (or triplets).
in your body is both human (possessed of a human
Green comments, “if biological humanness starts with
genome) and alive. Human gametes (ova and sperm)
the appearance of a unique diploid genome, twins and
are alive, and sperm even swim. So the question, “when
triplets are living evidence that the early embryo is
does human life begin?” is better understood as asking,
not yet one human being, but a community of possi“when does an individual human organism come into
bly different individuals held together by a gelatinous
existence?”
membrane.”3 He goes on to quote an embryology text
One answer is that a human organism comes into exas saying, “a genetically unique but non-individuated
istence at conception. Those who hold the conception
embryo has yet to acquire determinate individuality, a
view adopt the biological humanity criterion of moral
stable human identity.”4 In this view, a genuine human
status, which says that all and only human organisms
organism begins to exist only after twinning is no lonhave full moral status. In addition, they believe that a
ger possible: at the beginning of gastrulation when the
human organism exists at the moment of conception.
primitive streak (the precursor of the nervous system)
Indeed, they usually hold that this is a plain matter of
forms. In a pregnancy, gastrulation coincides with imbiological fact.
plantation, the imbedding of the embryo in the uterus,
However, this is dubious, as there are biological reawhich occurs about fourteen days after fertilization.
sons to think that the unique human organism begins
The debate over when a human organism comes into
to exist only some time after the beginning of fertilizaexistence occurs within the context of the biological
tion. Fertilization or conception does not occur at a
humanity criterion. However, the criterion itself has
precise moment. It is a process taking place over hours,
been challenged.
even days. The process of conception is not completed
until syngamy, when the chromosomes from the egg
The Person View
and the sperm have merged, some time after the sperm
In her classic article, “On the Moral and Legal Stahas penetrated the egg. However, even syngamy may
tus of Abortion,”5 Mary Anne Warren argues that the
not mark the beginning of a human organism. Ron
conservative view on abortion rests on a confusion beGreen points out,
tween two distinct senses of “human being.” One sense
is biological or genetic. It refers to the species to which
biologists usually describe the cells of an organan entity belongs. Human fetuses are unquestionably
ism has having the full range of cellular structure
human in the biological sense. However, it does not folincluding a single cell nucleus that contains DNA
low from their genetic humanity that they are human
within its own nuclear membrane. But at syngamy
in the other sense, the moral sense, which refers to
the zygote has no deﬁnitive nuclear membrane…
their moral status and rights. Why should a biological
A distinctive diploid cell nucleus does not make its
category confer a special moral status? The belief that
appearance until the two-cell stage, after the zygote
humanness does imply such a status and rights (human
undergoes its ﬁrst cell division…2
rights) stems from a failure to distinguish between the
two senses. To avoid this confusion, Warren suggests
Moreover, in the early stages of an embryo’s life, many
that we reserve the term “human” for the biological
of its cells, or blastomeres, remain “totipotent.” This
or genetic sense, and use the term “person” to refer
means that each blastomere is undifferentiated and
to beings who are full-ﬂedged members of the moral
defining the beginningand the end of human life • spring 2006
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community, possessed of moral rights – in particular,
the right to life. This enables us to avoid begging the
question in the abortion debate, for it remains an open
question whether a human fetus is a person with a
right to life.
Why not base moral status and moral rights on species membership? After all, all the persons we know
are, in fact, members of the species homo sapiens. Why
not use species membership as a marker for moral personhood? The reason is the arbitrariness of limiting
moral status to genetic human beings. This can be seen
if we imagine coming across an extraterrestrial like
the eponymous character in the movie, E.T. If we were
deciding what it would be morally permissible to do
to him – say, put him in a zoo, or make him into hamburger – surely the question would not be decided by
the number of chromosomes in his cells (if he even had
chromosomes). His not being a member of the species
homo sapiens would not determine his moral status.
It seems likely that we would regard him as a person
– a non-human person – with all the rights of any one
of us.
The example of E.T. is meant to show that biological
humanity isn’t a necessary condition of full moral status. Instead, moral status is based on certain psychological characteristics, such as sentience, consciousness, self-consciousness, the ability to use language,
rationality, and moral agency. These characteristics
are typical of members of our species, but not necessarily limited to them, as the example of E.T. is intended
to show. Moreover, there seem to be members of our
species who lack these person-making characteristics,
such as anencephalic babies and patients in persistent
vegetative states. They are biologically human, but not
persons, and thus do not have the moral status reserved
to persons.
An objection made to the person view is that, without an account of the moral relevance of person-making characteristics, it is as arbitrary as a theory based
on species membership. Why should moral status and
moral rights be limited to sentient, self-conscious, language-using, rational agents? Moreover, depending on
how many person-making characteristics are needed
for full moral status and rights, the person view appears to exclude those human beings who, due to severe
developmental disabilities or mental illness or senility,
or even infancy, do not have the capacity to reason or
use language. It is hard to accept that human beings in
these categories – who are often members of our own
families – are not moral persons, with the same moral
status and rights as the rest of us. Advocates of the biological humanity criterion maintain that any criterion
other than genetic humanity will have this fatal ﬂaw.
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The challenge, then, is to construct a theory of moral
status that is neither arbitrary (like the biological humanity criterion) nor unduly restrictive (like the person view). Moreover, the view should explain the moral
relevance of its criterion for moral status.

The Interest View6
The interest view bases moral status on the possession of interests. The view derives from Joel Feinberg’s
“interest principle,”7 which was intended to answer
the question, what kinds of beings can logically have
rights? Feinberg suggests that the answer comes from
the purpose or function of rights, which is to protect
the interests of the being alleged to have the rights. He
usefully analogizes having an interest in something to
having a “stake” in it. I am better off if the things in
which I have a stake, such as my health, my career, my
assets, my family, ﬂourish or prosper. Their ﬂourishing
is in my interest. Feinberg writes:
One’s interests, then, taken as a miscellaneous collection, consist of all those things in which one has
a stake, whereas one’s interest in the singular, one’s
personal interest or self-interest, consists in the
harmonious advancement of all of one’s interests
in the plural. These interests...are distinguishable
components of a person’s well-being: he ﬂourishes or languishes as they ﬂourish or languish.
What promotes them is to his advantage or in his
interest; what thwarts them is to his detriment or
against his interest.8
This is not to claim a one-to-one connection between
what a person desires and what is in his self-interest.
I can take an interest in something (like junk food)
that is not in my interest; and something can be in my
interest but not be something I take an interest in (like
exercise). But the reason exercise is in my interest, and
junk food is not, is that exercise promotes other goals
and desires of mine, such as staying healthy and alive,
and eating junk food does not. If I had no desires, goals,
or preferences at all, nothing would be in my interest.
Unless a being has interests and a welfare of its own,
it makes no sense to ascribe rights to it. Feinberg’s
insight about the logical conditions of having rights
can be applied more generally to having moral status.
To have moral status is to count or matter, from the
moral point of view. If a being has moral status, then its
interests must be considered when we engage in moral
deliberation. If a being has no interests, its interests
cannot be considered. So the possession of interests
is a necessary condition of having moral status, and I
would argue that it is also a sufﬁcient condition. That
is, if a being has interests, there is no justiﬁcation for
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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It matters to sentient beings what one does to them, and this is why
they have moral claims on us. To take a homely example, it is ﬁne if a
child plucks the petals off a daisy while saying, “He loves me, he loves
me not.” It is not ﬁne if the child recites the rhyme while pulling
legs off an insect, or the feathers off a (trapped) bird.
ignoring those interests when making moral decisions.
(It is a separate question how much weight to accord to
the interests of different beings, that is, whether there
are other factors that give some beings a higher moral
status than others.)
The Feinbergian account of having interests as having stakes in things suggests a conceptual link between
interests and consciousness. Only conscious beings
– beings with some sort of mental life, however rudimentary – can have wants; only beings with wants can
have a stake in anything; only beings that can have
a stake in something can have interests of their own.
Non-conscious beings, whether mere things (like cars
and rocks and works of art) or living things without
nervous systems (like plants), have no interests of their
own. This is not to say that they cannot be cared for or
neglected; repaired or destroyed; nourished or killed.
It is rather to say that it does not matter to non-conscious beings what we do to them. We can preserve
their existence, and even promote their welfare in the
sense of making them better entities of a certain kind.
For example, we can fertilize the roses so that they
grow vigorously and bloom; we can bring in the car for
regular service so that it runs beautifully. However, we
cannot do these things out of concern for what matters
to them, because nothing matters to them. They do not
have a stake in anything, including their own existence.
For this reason, I maintain that they, unlike conscious
beings, do not have a welfare or sake of their own.
Some will object that we cannot base moral status on
consciousness unless we have a deﬁnition of consciousness, but there does not seem to be any satisfactory,
non-circular deﬁnition. Acknowledging the problem,
David Boonin says, “It is tempting to say that to be
conscious is to be aware of something, for example, but
then awareness will surely have to be deﬁned in terms
of being in a conscious state.”9 What follows from the
absence of a deﬁnition of consciousness? Not much,
Boonin argues. It is not as if we had no idea what consciousness is. He writes:
As Nagel famously put it, using an expression that
has since become ubiquitous in discussions of the
subject, “an organism has conscious mental states
if and only if there is something that it is like to be

that organism – something it is like for the organism.” Even if this does not constitute a deﬁnition
of consciousness, you do know what I am talking
about when I refer to the fact that there is something that it is like to be you when you see a clear
blue sky, hear a shrill scream, feel a sharp prick, or
a cold wind, or a burning itch. And this is enough to
make clear what is meant by the claim that there is
a morally relevant difference between an organism
that is conscious in this sense and an organism that
is not.10
The morally relevant difference between conscious and
non-consciousness beings is that conscious beings have
interests and a welfare of their own, compounded out
of those interests. Non-conscious beings do not have
either of these things.
Sentience is only one form of conscious awareness,
but it is a very important one. If a being is sentient, that
is, it can experience treatment as painful, it has at least
one interest: the interest in not experiencing pain. The
fact that a being can suffer gives us a reason to treat
it in certain ways, and not in other ways. It matters
to sentient beings what one does to them, and this is
why they have moral claims on us. To take a homely
example, it is ﬁne if a child plucks the petals off a daisy
while saying “He loves me, he loves me not.” It is not
ﬁne if the child recites the rhyme while pulling the legs
off an insect, or the feathers off a (trapped) bird.

Implications of the Interest View for Embryos
Embryos are not mere things. They are alive and, under
certain conditions, have the potential to become beings with interests – indeed, to become people, like you
and me. But their potential to become persons does
not give them the moral status or the rights of actual
persons. Early embryos, indeed early-gestation fetuses,
have no consciousness, no awareness, no experiences
of any kind, even the most rudimentary. Without even
the precursor of a nervous system, pre-implantation
embryos cannot possibly have any kind of consciousness. Without consciousness, they cannot have desires;
without desires, they cannot have interests. It is not
wrong to kill embryos because it doesn’t matter to an
embryo whether it is killed or goes on living. Its con-
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tinued existence is clearly not something an embryo
takes an interest in, because it is impossible for a nonconscious, non-sentient being to take an interest in
anything. More importantly, the interest view maintains that continued existence is not in the interest of
a non-sentient fetus. For continued existence to be in
its interest, it would have to have a welfare of its own,
compounded out of all of its interests taken together.
Lacking interests, embryos do not have a welfare of
their own. In this respect, they are like gametes. Gametes are alive and human, but this is not sufﬁcient for
moral status. To have moral status is to be the kind of
being whose interests and welfare we moral agents are
required to consider. Without interests, there is nothing to consider. This is not to say that there might not
be other reasons, including moral reasons, to protect
non-interested beings. It is to say that these reasons
cannot stem from their own interests or welfare, since
they have none. Indeed, on a plausible conception
of harming as setting back a being’s interests, it follows that killing non-interested beings does not harm
them.11 If this sounds odd, it is because, for us, being
killed is ordinarily the greatest of harms. But that is
because we have interests, and in particular, an interest in continuing to exist. However, if a being has no
interests, death is not a harm to it, any more than being
destroyed is a harm to an automobile.
Of course, embryos differ from automobiles in one
very signiﬁcant way: embryos are living beings with
the potential to develop into human persons, just like
you or me, if they are not killed. In a now-classic article,
Don Marquis argues that it is wrong to kill fetuses for
the very same reason that it is wrong to kill you or
me: because doing so deprives them (and us) of our
valuable futures. In the next section, I will assess the
Valuable Futures argument and its implications for the
morality of killing embryos.

Marquis and the Valuable Futures Argument
According to Marquis, both sides of the abortion debate have insurmountable problems. What is needed is
a fresh start, an account of why killing is wrong in the
paradigm cases in which everyone would agree that it
is wrong – namely, the killing of adult human beings,
like you or me. Killing adult human beings is prima
facie wrong because killing them deprives them of their
future. Marquis writes:
The loss of one’s life is one of the greatest losses one
can suffer. The loss of one’s life deprives one of all
the experiences, activities, projects, and enjoyments
that would otherwise have constituted one’s future.
Therefore, killing someone is wrong, primarily
because the killing inﬂicts (one of) the greatest pos30

sible losses on the victim.…When I am killed, I am
deprived both of what I now value which would
have been part of my future personal life, but also
what I would come to value. Therefore, when I
die, I am deprived of all of the value of my future.
Inﬂicting this loss on me is ultimately what makes
killing me wrong. This being the case, it would
seem that what makes killing any adult human
being prima facie seriously wrong is the loss of his
or her future.12
But exactly the same is true of killing a human fetus,
and so abortion is, prima facie, wrong. Prima facie because killing is wrong only if it deprives the one killed
of a “valuable future” or a “future-like-ours” (FLO, as
it has come to be referred to). Thus, the valuable futures argument does not imply that it is wrong to kill
someone in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) because
someone in PVS no longer has a valuable future. It’s
also consistent with voluntary euthanasia, because persons who are severely and incurably ill and who face
a future of pain and despair and who wish to die will
not have suffered a loss if they are killed, because the
future of which they are deprived is not considered
by them to be a valuable one. Equally, the aborting of
fetuses with defects so severe as to prevent them having FLO might be justiﬁable on Marquis’s account.
How severe would the disabling condition have to be
to make abortion morally permissible? Is it only lethal
conditions (such as Tay-Sachs disease) which deprive
fetuses of FLO? Or could non-lethal conditions, such
as mental retardation, deprive a fetus of FLO, and thus
justify abortion? Marquis does not address these sorts
of questions, indeed, does not provide an account of
“just what it is about my future or the futures of other
adult human beings which make it wrong to kill us.”13
His aim is, rather, to show that abortion is in general a
grave wrong. For most fetuses clearly do have valuable
futures. If they are not aborted, they will come to have
lives they will value and enjoy, just as you and I value
and enjoy our lives. Therefore, abortion is seriously
wrong for the same reason that killing an innocent
adult human being is seriously wrong: it deprives the
victim of his or her valuable future.
On the interest view, the killing of non-sentient beings is not seriously wrong because non-sentient beings
are not deprived of anything they want or have a stake
in by being killed. Marquis thinks that this reveals a
fundamental ﬂaw in the interest view, or indeed in
any sentience- or desire-based view. First, it seems to
imply that it is not wrong to kill someone in a reversible coma or even in deep and dreamless sleep. Such a
person is not now conscious or sentient. If we explain
the wrongness of killing him by appealing to his future
journal of law, medicine & ethics
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is a dispositional belief. Nevertheless, it is one of your
beliefs, a belief you already have. As Boonin puts it,
“you do not lose all of your beliefs each time you go to
bed and then acquire a new and identical set of beliefs
each time you wake up. You retain your beliefs as dispositional beliefs and occasionally have some or others
as occurrent beliefs.”15
Similarly, if you desire not to be killed, you continue
to have that desire dispositionally while you are in a
reversible coma. On the basis of this desire, we can
ascribe to you an interest in continued existence, an
interest that exerts a moral claim on the rest of us not
to kill you while you are temporarily comatose. But the
same cannot be said of a being, like an embryo, that has
never been conscious and so has no desires, occurrent
or dispositional, and hence no interests.
In a forthcoming article, “Abortion Revisited,” Marquis writes, “Boonin’s account of and defense of a dispositional desire strategy for dealing with the alleged
temporarily unconscious adult counterexample to the
present desire view seems reasonable.”16 I take this to
mean that Marquis now agrees that the alleged counter-example of the temporarily comatose adult is not
a problem for desire- or sentience-based accounts.
But what about someone who has no desire, occurrent or dispositional, to go on living, due to severe but
temporary depression? Can the interest view
explain why it would be seriously wrong to
Abortion is seriously wrong for the same
kill such a person without at the same time
reason that killing an innocent adult human
implying that it would be seriously wrong to
kill a fetus?
being is seriously wrong: it deprives the
Boonin responds by arguing that somevictim of his or her valuable future.
times we need to correct a person’s actual desires because, due to various distorting condithe person killed, though Marquis leaves it open that
tions, they do not represent what the individual really
there might be other reasons why killing him would
wants. He writes, “…in many cases in which we believe
be wrong.)
that the present desires of others are morally signiﬁThe interest view is not vulnerable to these alleged
cant, we distinguish between the actual content of the
counter-examples. The difference between a fetus and
desire that a person has given her actual circumstances
a temporarily comatose adult (TCA) is that a TCA has
and the content the desire she actually has would have
desires, including a desire to go on living, that make it
had if the actual desire had been formed under more
seriously wrong to kill him. The same is not true of an
ideal circumstances.”17 In the case of the depressed perembryo or ﬁrst-trimester fetus, which has no desires at
son who does not want to live, it is the depression that
all.14 Admittedly, a TCA does not have any conscious
makes him unable to think clearly and unable to enjoy
desires. But even while he is unconscious, he still has
his life. When he comes out of the depression, life will
desires, just as he still has beliefs. David Boonin points
seem to him to be worth living again. So of course it
out that not all of our beliefs are ones of which we are
would be seriously wrong to kill him while he is in the
consciously aware: they are not all occurrent beliefs.
depressed state. As Boonin puts it, “…when someone’s
To illustrate the dispositional nature of many of our
desires are such that they would very strongly desire
beliefs, Boonin gives the following example. Ten minthat you not do something to them were they able to
utes ago you probably were not consciously aware of
reﬂect more clearly on the question, then that counts
believing that a triangle has three sides. Yet if I were
as a very strong moral reason not to do it.”18
to ask you, “how many sides does a triangle have?” you
Marquis thinks that the case of the depressed person
would be disposed to answer, “three.” That is why it
(“Hans” in Boonin’s example) and the fetus are analoconscious states, then it seems that it is equally wrong
to kill a pre-conscious fetus, who will become conscious
and sentient in the natural course of events, if it is not
aborted. Either the interest view entails that it is morally permissible to kill temporarily comatose adults,
in which case it cannot be the right view of moral status, or it must concede that it is wrong to kill fetuses,
in which case it cannot be the basis for a defense of
abortion. By contrast, the FLO account can explain the
wrongness of killing temporarily unconscious adults;
this deprives them of their valuable futures.
Second, Marquis argues, the interest view cannot explain why it is wrong to kill someone who is conscious
and sentient, but who does not want to go on living. If
it is the desire to go on living that makes killing someone seriously wrong, then presumably it is not wrong
to kill someone who does not have the desire to go
on living, due to (treatable) depression. But of course,
Marquis argues, it is wrong, and the FLO account can
explain why. A person can have a valuable future, even
if, due to depression, he does not now have the desire
to go on living. It would be seriously wrong to kill him
and thereby to deprive him of that valuable future.
(Presumably it would not be wrong to kill someone
whose depression was untreatable and who faced “a
future of pain and despair.” At least, it would not wrong
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gous. If what makes killing Hans seriously wrong is
that Hans would want to go on living if he were able to
think clearly, then why can’t we say that what makes
killing the fetus wrong is that it would want to go on
living, if it could think about it. This is not like saying
that a rock would want to go on living if it could think
about it, because unlike a rock, a fetus has a future of
value, that is, a life that it will value in the future. In
this respect, the fetus is just like Hans. And so Marquis
writes, “Fetuses are quite different. Hypothetical desires can be attributed as easily to fetuses as to Hans.”19
However, fetuses do not have distorted desires, which
need correcting in order to perceive what they really
want. Preconscious fetuses do not have desires at all.
It seems to me one thing to ascribe an ideal or hypothetical desire to a person whose desires have been
distorted, and quite another to ascribe hypothetical desires to a being incapable of having any desires. In any
event, I am not sure how much Marquis wants or needs
to base his argument on the ascription of hypothetical desires to fetuses, as he has a different argument,
which is not dependent on the existence of such desires. He suggests that we can “…attribute interests to
a presently insentient being in virtue of its well-being
at some future sentient stage of its natural history.”20
In other words, although the fetus is now unconscious
and has no desires, it can still have an interest in its
future, in the sense that its future is in its interest. The
motivation for this claim is the view of the fetus as just
one stage in a person’s natural history. If my life and
my future existence are something I value, then it is
rational for me to be glad that I was not killed at an
earlier stage, for example, when I was a fetus. My valuable future is its valuable future. Having that future
(that is, not being killed) is as much in its interest as it
is in mine. Or rather, not being killed is as much in my
interest when I was a fetus as it is in my interest now.

McMahan’s Mind Essentialism
So the next question is, was I ever a fetus? That may
seem indisputable, given the biological facts. Everyone,
surely, started life as a zygote, which developed into an
embryo, which became a fetus, and then was born as
a baby. However, this is exactly what Jeff McMahan
wants to deny. He writes,
…even if we grant that a new human organism begins to exist at conception, it follows from this fact
that we began to exist at conception only if we are
human organisms.…if I am a human organism, I
began to exist when this organism did. But the assumption that I am numerically identical with the
organism with which (to put it as neutrally as possible) I coexist is hardly uncontroversial.21
32

McMahan thinks that the most plausible account of
what I essentially am is an embodied consciousness.
And if that’s the case, then I never existed as a nonconscious fetus. I came into existence when my organism
began to be conscious – sometime between 20 and 28
weeks of gestation.22 Summarizing McMahan’s position, David DeGrazia writes,
…the thesis of mind essentialism implies that early
fetuses, lacking minds, cannot become minded
beings, since it asserts that anything that is ever
minded is always minded. Thus, early abortions
do not kill beings with signiﬁcant moral status,
making these abortions “relevantly like contraception and wholly unlike the killing of a person.” The
Valuable Futures Argument therefore trips on the
mistaken assumption that the early fetus will develop into a minded being. Because it will not, the
early fetus does not have a valuable future.23
McMahan’s theory provides a neat response to Marquis
– but only if one accepts his mind essentialism, and the
idea that the preconscious fetus cannot develop into
a conscious fetus, much less a person like you or me.
That seems to me to ﬂy in the face of the facts. It seems
much more plausible to say that I was once a child, and
before that an infant, and before that a fetus. Boonin,
commenting on the pictures in his ofﬁce of his son, Eli,
at various stages after birth, says, “through all of the
remarkable changes that these pictures preserve, he
remains unmistakably the same little boy.” He also has
another picture of Eli taken 24 weeks before his birth.
Boonin writes, “there is no doubt in my mind that this
picture, too, shows that same little boy at a very early
stage in his physical development.”24 McMahan would
have to say that the sonogram is a picture of Eli’s organism at a very early stage, but it is not a picture of Eli. I
would say (and I assume Boonin would agree) that I am
my organism, although this is not all that I am. However, to posit a “me” that is distinct from my physical
self seems implausible, and the wrong way to defend
abortion. Rather, I would say that when I was a fetus, it
would have been permissible to abort me, because had
I been aborted before I became conscious and sentient,
it would not have mattered to me. It would have made
no more difference to me than preventing my conception. So while I agree with Marquis that I was once a
fetus, I deny that when I was a fetus, I had an interest
or a stake in my valuable future. I think that when I was
a mindless fetus, I had no interests at all.

Implications for Blastocysts
I began this paper with the question whether it is seriously wrong to kill embryos at the blastocyst stage. I
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moral status is that the embryo is a human organism
want to suggest now that even if Marquis is right about
(although, as we have seen, there is considerable debate
the morality of abortion – that it’s wrong to kill fetuses
about when a human organism comes into existence).
because they have valuable futures it is not plausible to
On this criterion, the moral status of the embryo is
claim that pre-implantation embryos do. For unlike a
determined by its genetic humanity, not what it can or
fetus, an extracorporeal embryo is not developing into
cannot develop into. Marquis, however, explicitly resomeone with a valuable future. Left alone (that is,
not aborted), the fetus will (most likely) develop into
jects the genetic humanity criterion, because it is hard
someone with a valuable future. But the same is just
to see why a merely biological category should make
not true of an embryo, whether left-over from IVF or
a moral difference. Clearly, he is sympathetic to this
deliberately created for research. Left alone, an extraobjection expressed by pro-choicers: “why, it is asked,
corporeal embryo will just die. That’s not much of a
is it any more reasonable to base a moral conclusion
valuable future.
on the number of chromosomes in one’s cells than on
It might be argued that the blastocyst could be imthe color of one’s skin?”26 By contrast, on the Valuable
planted into a uterus, where it too would develop into a baby, and thus it has, hypothetiIt seems to me one thing to ascribe an ideal
cally, a valuable future. Of course, this is true
only of viable embryos. Non-viable embryos
or hypothetical desire to a person whose
– embryos incapable of further development
desires have been distorted, and quite
– cannot have valuable futures. Presumably,
another to ascribe hypothetical desires to a
even on Marquis’s view, it would be morally
permissible to use non-viable embryos left
being incapable of having any desires.
over from infertility treatment in embryo research (although I do not know if the stem
cells derived from non-viable embryos could be used
Futures approach, the developmental potential of an
in treating disease, should ES cell therapies ever be
embryo makes all the difference in the world, since if a
developed).
cloned embryo cannot develop into someone like you
Most opponents of ES cell research make no distincor me, it cannot have FLO. Killing it does not deprive
tion between embryos created by IVF and embryos
it of its valuable future, and therefore, presumably, is
not seriously wrong.
created by cloning. However, on the Valuable Futures
This has interesting implications for the “created/
approach, there might be a considerable difference. We
spare”
distinction, appealed to by the National Bioethknow that it is possible, under some set of conditions,
for an IVF embryo to develop into a baby. Over 35,000
ics Advisory Commission (NBAC) in its report, Cloning
babies were born in the United States alone in 2000
Human Beings. According to NBAC, it would be wrong
(ASRM/SART Registry 2004). By contrast, biologist
to create embryos solely for the purpose of research;
Rudof Jaenisch maintains that “a cloned embryo has
to do so would be inconsistent with the respect due to
little, if any, potential to develop into a normal human
embryos as a form of human life. However, it would
being.” He explains:
be ethically permissible to use embryos created for reproductive purposes, which are no longer needed (soBy circumventing the normal processes of gametocalled “spare” embryos), since these embryos would be
genesis and fertilization, nuclear cloning prevents
discarded anyway. President Bush considered this arthe proper reprogramming of the clone’s genome
gument in his August 6, 2001 address to the nation, but
…which is a prerequisite for the development of an
ultimately rejected it. He maintained that it was imperembryo into a normal organism. It is unlikely that
missible to kill any embryos, even those that would be
these biologic barriers to normal development can
discarded anyway. On the valuable futures approach,
be overcome in the foreseeable future.25
it appears that the created/spare distinction has moral
relevance, though precisely opposite to that claimed
Jaenisch hastens to point out that the embryonic stem
by NBAC. Whereas NBAC argued that only spare emcells derived from a cloned embryo are functionally inbryos can be ethically used (and destroyed) in research,
distinguishable from those derived from IVF embryos,
in the valuable futures approach, it would be morally
making them equally useful as a source for ES cells in
acceptable to use cloned human embryos as sources
research or therapy.
of stem cells since they lack FLO, but unacceptable to
The chance a human embryo has of developing into a
use embryos discarded after fertility treatment, since
normal human being is irrelevant from the perspective
they have FLO. They have FLO because they could be
of the biological humanity criterion. What matters for
used to make babies, even if their creators do not wish
defining the beginningand the end of human life • spring 2006
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to use them for this purpose. This is a rather startling
implication of the Valuable Futures argument. The
claim that it is morally better to use cloned embryos
rather than embryos left over from infertility treatment
is not one that I have seen anywhere in the Valuable
Futures literature.
My own view is that we should reject the created/
spare distinction, although not for the reason President
Bush gave. I think that it is permissible to use human
embryos in research that kills them because embryos
lack moral status. In my view, it makes no difference
what the source of the embryos is, whether they are
created by IVF or cloned; whether they are created
speciﬁcally for research purposes or are left over from
infertility treatment. However, I do not think it is permissible to use embryos for frivolous or trivial purposes. I maintain that respect for human life requires
that human embryos be used for morally important
purposes, but that is a topic for another paper.27
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